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Abstract 
This paper studies the applicability of globally recognized solvency measures for banking system solvency 
framework of developing and transition economy of Uzbekistan through theoretical concepts and pure practical 
evidences from several countries. Besides, it clearly indicates the differences and inherent aspects of banking 
systems of transition economies that should be on account in solvency stress tests. Theoretical recommendations 
in this article can be used in bank solvency frameworks or setting minimum requirements in other transition 
economies with similar banking system characteristics. 
 
1. Introduction 
Implications of global financial crisis demonstrate the importance of having an effective and appropriate 
financial system regulations and safety nets (BIS, 2012). The design of appropriate regulatory strategy to foster 
financial system stability and development has become a key area of focus in all countries to withstand the 
implications of the crisis which still have negative effects e.g. tensions and pressures in economy originated from 
banking and financial market disorders. Responses of economies to the impact of the crisis on banking system 
stability were derived from main weaknesses of financial sector and lessons from economywide downturn. For 
example, the United States enacted Comprehensive Dodd-Frank Act stress testing and Capital Analysis and 
Review (CCAR) to ensure the solvency by holding the capital of large banks above minimum requirements. 
Euro area banks are required to have more transparent balance sheets and better quality of assets as outlined in 
Comprehensive Assessment Exercise for one year period. Indonesia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom imposed lower debt-to-income ratio for banks. Russia and Turkey raised the risk weights 
and provisioning rates for consumer loans in order to strengthen loss-absorbing buffers. China raised bank 
provisioning requirements and risk weights and tightened regulation of non-standard credit products, and 
restricted off-balance-sheet funding (IMF, 2014). 
However, main focus of this paper is directed for issues of creating an appropriate bank solvency 
framework for transition economies which are vulnerable to any macroeconomic shocks and systemic 
imbalances. Ongoing economic reforms and formation of market based economic relations among population, 
relentless efforts for stability and growth consolidate the importance of banking system soundness in resilient 
transition. These aspects are common for nearly all post-Soviet countries that have strictly relied on national 
banking system stability policies targeted to cope with bank failures. In recent years the need to ensure bank 
solvency has dominated banking sector reforms in these economies. Banks’ financial strength deteriorated after 
the global financial crisis and many post-Soviet economies entered a bank solvency panics. Unsound profile of 
financial intermediaries revealed the growing need to keep bank solvency and profitability in condition of 
transition and systemic weaknesses. Bank solvency measures involved the recognition of profit losses, the 
disposal of impaired assets, and the build-up of robust capital buffers which led to significant fall in banks’ 
activeness in economic growth (Kan, 2011). However, some banking system stability policies have been 
strengthened through special frameworks to support failing banks based on international best practices. For 
instance, being a transition economy, Uzbekistan’s banking system has been took measures for keeping the 
sound solvency positions of commercial banks. Although those measures cushioned the crisis waves, concern of 
the policymakers from unexpected implications caused further actions. Studies accomplished in this article are 
built around banking system profile and indicators of Uzbekistan to analyse the responsiveness of banking 
system of transition economies which facilitates proposing recommendations common for all post-Soviet 
economies. 
 
2. Literature review 
Solvency of banking system has in the centre of debates among policymakers and academia for several decades. 
They have offered different solvency procedures, mechanisms, facilities, theoretical models and even strategies. 
Banking systems of most economies, both advanced and developing, have structural weaknesses in terms of 
stability and flexibility. Solvency and liquidity provision is the hottest point of banking system in economic 
crisis. Because as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) stressed, the primary function of banks is to ensure solvency by 
offering funding that is more liquid than their asset holdings. From this statement, a bank is found insolvent if 
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the value of its assets falls below the value of its debt and loses the ability to meet minimum regulatory capital 
requirements – solvency frameworks. This solvency mismatch makes commercial banks vulnerable to asset 
shocks. The reason for studying the solvency framework of banks in transition economies is based on the 
literature explaining bank failures based on the strength of the bank’s fundamentals. As Gorton (1988) proves 
that bank failure is systematic responses to the perceived risk of banks.  Diamond and Rajan (2005) found that 
insolvent banks deteriorates liquidity and profitability stance in the entire banking system. In condition of 
transition economy, banks responses to solvency risk are not so sufficiently strong that they cannot mitigate the 
probability of losses or crisis. Therefore, in line with developing and emerging counterparts, transition 
economies (they may be emerging or developing) need more prudent and flexible bank solvency regimes and 
policies. As IMF and World Bank joint research group found developing economies must strengthen the legal, 
regulatory, and supervisory frameworks of banks for keeping solvent banking system (2009). 
Responsiveness of banking system to insolvency shocks is often evaluated through stress test with 
different scenarios. Solvency stress testing models are large in number but different in fitting with the profile of 
banking systems. They devise a variety of approaches to examine the ability of banks to respond financial 
shocks. Mostly used and widespread stress testing model is forward looking model offered by European Central 
Bank which considers all conditions that banks may face. Other models assume only limited types of financial 
conditions and provide conclusions in a limited scope. For instance, balance–sheet approach assumes that 
balance sheet of poorly operating banks indicates the probability of insolvency and even bank crisis (Sahajwala 
and Van den Berg, 2000; Jagtiani, 2003). One cannot reject that balance sheet of banks clearly shows the 
financial stance of banks, but it can be said that it is a common fact and all solvency models rely on bank 
balance-sheet data. Market indicators approach assumes that equity and debt structure of banks can provide data 
on banks’ financial condition along with bank-balance sheet (Bongini, Laeven, and Majnoni, 2002; Gropp, 
Vesala, and Vulpes, 2002). Because market based early-warning systems contain the data on future prices of 
underlaying bank assets and can signal the probability of default. 
 
3. Case for bank solvency framework 
Bank solvency frameworks and insolvency regimes are not new term in international banking. As systemic 
banking failures occur, requirements for early warning systems – preliminary sets of signalling parameters for 
banking system performance are introduced in international experience. Benchmarking and standardization of 
bank performance in the scope of an entire banking system work as solvency requirements. In 1988 Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision enacted Basel Accord for bank performance which was the first milestone 
for international banking system regulatory and supervisory framework. Then, countries began launching a 
country-specific set of requirements for soundness of bank profiles based on the indicators of the Basel Accord 
in 1991. The last boom, after global financial crisis of 2008, most countries launched macroprudential policies 
for exiting and recovering the broken financial system from the waves and long term implications of the crisis. 
Macroprudential policies have been working on mainly rescuing the banking systems as a set of counter-crisis, 
post-crisis recovery and stabilization measures in most suffered economies from the crisis. In this period, 
vulnerable banking systems lost value of bank assets because of improper solvency frameworks and early-
warning systems or lack of flexibility to modifications. As a result, system-wide failures in financial sector led to 
the loss of power not only in many systemic important banks and too big to fail banks of advanced economies 
but also in second-tier commercial banks of developing and transition economies. Because risk measurement and 
management is comparatively difficult in banking systems of transition economies due to regular legislations and 
reforms which raises the exposure to external shock and their hidden effects.  
Most developing and transition economies are manipulating solvency frameworks in limited scope 
focusing on measurement and management of internal risks only. They often rely on minimum requirements of 
leverage ratio, despite the ratio of regulatory capital to risk weighted assets. Although leverage ratio ensures 
simplicity and transparency, it cannot ensure the power of the banking systems how to capture insolvency. 
Moreover, in case of uncertainties in risk measurement, risk-sensitive parameters and shifting the minimum 
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Figure 1. Insolvency frameworks and 
macroeconomic deleveraging 
Figure 2. Strength of insolvency procedures and 
Nonperforming loans, 2013 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2014. 
Therefore, it is mostly argued that ability of risk capture is a prerequisite of prudential framework for 
keeping the banking system solvent. According to financial sector development and financial soundness 
assessment principles, banking system stability is evaluated based on capital adequacy, liquidity and asset 
quality indicators (Figure 1 and 2). It indicates that capital adequacy indicators can be the best measurement of 
the ability of banking sector to absorb potential losses and withstand distress. Because potential risks to the 
solvency of banking system originate from impairment of assets which are required to be in normal quality to 
stay solvent. Asset quality indicators reflect quality of bank lending and bank asset portfolios.  Liquidity 
parameters of bank solvency monitor the banks with highly leveraged and exposed to impaired assets. 
Gained experience in international banking indicates that solvency frameworks of many countries are 
not sufficiently effective (IMF and World Bank, 2009). Because an effective bank solvency framework must be 
interlinked with a proper supervisory framework and relevant financial safety nets, and must be structured 
around potential systemic effects of bank failures, safeguarding financial stability in the course of bank 
insolvency and a special role of banking authorities in bank insolvency. 
 
4.1. Solvency stance and orientation of banking system in Uzbekistan 
Banking system of Uzbekistan has been performing comparatively well despite harsh conditions two periods of 
crises. It underwent two waives of bank insolvency challenges. In early independence period all banking systems 
of post-communist states faced bank insolvency problems originated from conversion to new national currencies, 
high inflation and lack of bank capitals. As a result, national banking systems faced solvency shortages derived 
from economy-wide effects. The second waive came in global financial crisis period which had a multilateral 
impact on all economic systems with greater shocks in banking system. Despite systemic difficulties, series of 
external shock from disintegration from Russian rouble zone, changing economic environment, Uzbek banks 
kept the robust growth and customer confidence (Figure 3). Number of banks grew and their services have 
grown and financial inclusion has increased.  
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Figure 3. Banking system performance in Uzbekistan in 2004-2014, mln UZS  
 
Source: Central Bank of Uzbekistan, 2004-2014 
Central Bank of Uzbekistan took appropriate measures to prevent the whole financial sector from crisis 
in deep through several financial stability mechanisms and financial crisis prevention facilities by means of 
direct and indirect state intervention and regulation instruments. Consequently, Uzbek banking system was 
comparatively stable in post-crisis recovery period (Table 1). Being an export oriented and investment attractive 
transition economy, Uzbek economy heavily relies on interbank operations and adequacy of currency reserves in 
international trade, which primarily requires a sound performance of banking system in order to facilitate a 
favourable investment and trade environment. An effective banking system for export capacity development and 
investment stimulation must have a long term bank solvency policy with prudent principles.   
Table 1. Post-crisis bank solvency indicators in Uzbekistan, 2011-2014 
Bank stability indicators 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Risk weighted regulatory capital 24,1 24,3 24,3 23,8 
Risk weighted tier-1 capital 21,8 22,3 22,5 22,1 
Nonperforming loans to total bank capital 1,2 1 0,9 0,9 
Non-performing loans to total lending 0,7 0,5 0,4 0,4 
Asset quality 1,9 1,9 1,95 1,97 
Capital adequacy 14,4 16,3 17,2 17,6 
Interest rate margin to gross income 35,2 36,4 36,4 37,2 
Liquid assets to total assets 31,2 31,8 31,9 31,9 
Liquid assets to long term liabilities 71,3 73,4 73,5 74,7 
Total capital to total assets 12,2 11,4 11,2 11,7 
Source: Economic Bulletin of Uzbekistan, 2015 
Uzbekistan launched a protection scheme from credit risk in order to keep second-tier banks stable in 
condition of excessive lending. In this scheme banks asses the riskiness of a loan in five broad levels and transact 
the particular percentage of the issued loan to the account of the bank in Central Bank of Uzbekistan as a 
mandatory reserve. As a long term solvency framework Uzbek banking system adapted minimum requirements 
of Basel Accord 2.5 as it lines the floors of bank capital management, and it will adopt Basel III from 1 January 
2019 as an approbation for a particular period (CBU, 2013). 
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4.2. Prudent bank solvency framework and specific issues of solvency stress test for Uzbekistan (and other 
transition economies) 
Specific effective bank solvency framework is intended to identify and mitigate possible threats to banking 
system stability and to design appropriate set of measures. It focuses on exposures, buffers, and linkages to 
assess the soundness and vulnerabilities of the financial system, as well as the economic, regulatory, and 
institutional determinants of financial soundness and stability. 
It considers whether the financial sector exhibits vulnerabilities that could trigger a liquidity or 
solvency crisis, amplify macroeconomic shocks, or impede policy responses to shocks. The monitoring and 
analysis of financial stability involves an assessment of macroeconomic conditions, soundness of financial 
institutions and markets, financial system supervision, and the financial infrastructure to determine what the 
vulnerabilities are in the financial system and how they are being managed. 
Figure 4. Effective bank solvency framework 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
While these five principles of effective solvency framework are commonly applicable, key elements 
can be adjusted in consistent with existing financial, legal, institutional, and cultural conditions of any banking 
system. In Uzbekistan’s rules on bank solvency ratios are based on the minimum requirements of the Central 
Bank rooted from Basel rules of 1988. The rules are harmonized of requirements for bank assets, solvency ratio 
of banks on account of credit risk, capital adequacy with respect to foreign exchange risks, position risks, 
settlement risks and other risks of exposures. Prudential bank solvency framework should be built on the basis of 
concrete model because of transition to modern and dynamic banking system from traditional one. Transition 
character and developing structure of Uzbek banking system require applicability check-ups and stress tests for 
solvency and liquidity profiles, as shown in FSAP of IMF. Assessment of ability of banking system to withstand 
different risks and systemic shocks enables authorities to set accomodative requirements for effective bank 
solvency framework. Specifically, solvency stress test should be tailored for Uzbekistan deriving from standard 
bank solvency stress test principles and mentioned features of bank is system in following respects: 
• it takes exposures of a banking system into account, including both performing and nonperforming 
loans and both expected and unexpected losses), although bank stress tests tend to focus on performing 
loans and unexpected losses in principle; 
•  it focuses on  probability of default derived from banking system, while bank solvency stress tests 
typically focuses on historical default rates and models; 
• it relies on bank-specific data and is suitable for assessing bank capital needs especially, balance sheet 
solvency and asset quality because bank ownership is in four different forms; 
• it reveals solidity of initial capital and deterioration scenario of profit loss under solvency pressures 
• it clearly highlights the presence of capital buffers and available safety nets. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Many countries affected by global financial developed their bank solvency regimes through balance sheet 
restructuring: recapitalization; stimulating low interest rates to increase profits from loan and investments; and 
significant fiscal support for improving lending performance.  As their experiments proved that monitoring and 
analysis of financial stability involves an assessment of macroeconomic conditions, soundness of financial 
institutions and markets, financial system supervision, and the financial infrastructure to determine what the 
vulnerabilities are in the financial system and how they are being managed. 
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Although the new regulatory structure is functioning well, more intensive and intrusive supervision is 
needed. Compliance with international standards for regulation and supervision of banks and insurers is 
generally high, but national resolution and deposit insurance frameworks need to be strengthened, and positive 
changes to supervisory practices need to be sustained. 
Having a solvent banking profile requires sound stability, efficiency and profitability indicators. In the context of 
transition economies, following recommendations raise these three interlinked soundness indicators: 
• Using Basel III minimum requirements to Uzbek banking system in wider coverage of bank 
determinants in order to (a) ensure system-wide bank solvency and (b) improve transparency of banks’ 
activities, (c) transfer the devaluation reserves from regulatory capital to private capital, (d) provide 
bank customers with information on asset quality of service banks.  
• Banks always need permanent sources of income to stay solvent in the market of financial services by 
seeking new opportunities of risk free financial products and widening financial inclusion. 
• Restructuring the composition of bank assets by raising deposit to lending ratio and reviewing the 
profitability of Greenfield investments (banks in all post-Soviet economies have greenfield or direct 
investments). 
• Strengthening credit guarantee schemes and terms & conditions. 
• From practical point of view, wider involvement in government’s social projects although they bring 
less profit. Government covers the lost income at the end of the fiscal year (the only loss in time value 
of money) and supports the bank if it faces temporary insolvency. This practice is very common 
socially oriented market economies including Uzbekistan. 
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